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Abstract Brain death or neurologic death has gradually be-
come recognized as human death over the past decades 
worldwide. Nevertheless, in Japan, the New York State, and 
the State of New Jersey, one can be exempt from death de-
termination based on neurologic criteria even in the state 
of brain death. In Japan, the 1997 Act on Organ Transplanta-
tion legalized brain death determination exclusively when 
organs were to be procured from brain-dead patients. Even 
after the 2009 revision, the default definition of death con-
tinued to be cardio-pulmonary criteria, despite the criti-
cism. The cases of Japan and the United States provide a 
good reference as social experiments of appreciating con-
scientious or religio-cultural dimensions in health care. This 
text theoretically examines the 1997 Act on Organ Trans-
plantation of Japan and its 2009 revision, presenting some 
characteristics of Japan’s case compared to American cas-
es and the implications its approach has for the rest of the 
world. This is an example in which a foreign idea that did 
not receive widespread support from Japanese citizens was 
transformed to fit the religio-cultural landscape.
Brain death (neurologic death) has gradually been recog-
nized as human death over the past decades worldwide. 
Nevertheless, in Japan, the New York State, and the State 
of New Jersey, one can be exempt from death determina-
tion based on neurologic criteria even in the case of brain 
death. The New York State established the Guidelines for 
the Determination of Brain Death (1987, 1995, 2005) to ac-
commodate religious or moral objections to brain death 
(1). The State of New Jersey also enacted the Declaration of 
Death Act (1991) to accommodate religious objections to 
brain death (2). All this resulted from the accommodation 
of religious and moral objections to neurologic criteria. 
Hans-Martin Sass argued for “a formula for a global Uniform 
Determination of Death statute, based on the ‘entire brain 
including brain stem’ criteria as a default position, but al-
lowing competent adults by means of advance directives 
to choose other criteria for determining death during the 
process of dying (3).” These cases provide a good reference 
as social experiments in order to evaluate this formula.
In the text, the term “conscience” or its adjective form is 
chosen as a superordinate concept to moral/religious be-
lief according to conventional usage. Conscience might 
appear universal whereas religio-cultural dimension differs 
among nations. In this text, conscience is considered to 
manifest itself within different societal traditions.
THE 1997 ACT ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION OF 
JAPAN AND THE 2009 REVISION
In Japan, following a decade-long national debate on brain 
death and organ transplantation, the 1997 Act on Organ 
Transplantation legalized brain death determination exclu-
sively when organs are to be procured from a brain-dead 
patient. Antipathy to brain death determination among 
the Japanese was often regarded as the primary reason 
for this prolonged law-making process. Japan’s case was a 
prototypical example in which health care was influenced 
by religio-cultural differences.
Under the 1997 Act on Organ Transplantation, brain death 
as a criterion for death determination was applied only 
to those who had consented to donate their organs and 
whose family did not refuse organ procurement after de-
termination of brain death. Otherwise, death determina-
tion was performed on cardio-pulmonary (triad of death) 
criteria, which did not determine brain death and which 
was the default death definition. Consent by the patient 
himself/herself to donate organs in the brain death state 
was considered indispensable. This provision was a result 
of compromises in the Diet (Japanese Parliament). The re-
sulting shortage of transplantable organs was ascribed to 
the restrictive provisions of this act. The first revision was 
expected in 3 years but it was substantially delayed.
The delayed revision in 2009 went into effect the following 
year (4). Some criticized the original draft for the revision 
for trying to adopt an alternative definition. Although the 
double standard scheme within the 1997 act was con-
sidered as transient, the death determination based 
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on brain death criteria remained exclusively limited to or-
gan donors. The default definition of death continued to 
be cardio-pulmonary criteria.
The revision enabled organ procurement/transplant for 
children, and it enabled organ procurement from patients 
whose will was unknown, as long as the family consent-
ed. Not only the patients themselves but also their fami-
lies were entitled to refuse brain death determination. If 
the patient was willing to donate organs but the family re-
fused, the patient’s will was overridden. In these cases, the 
families’ objection can overturn the patients’ acceptance of 
brain death. Significantly, unless otherwise instructed, the 
patient was assumed to be willing to donate organs. But 
such assumption was disguised as familial or surrogate de-
cision-making, which appeared more acceptable as well as 
familiar in Japanese society.
DISPuTAbLE ROLES OF CONSCIENCE
There is no consensus regarding the influence of religiosity 
or conscience on Japan’s case. Scholars, including Robert 
Veatch (5,6) and Canadian medical anthropologist Marga-
ret Lock (7), have ascribed Japan’s adherence to cardio-pul-
monary death definition to religio-cultural factors (5). Ve-
atch noted that “It is possible that the uniquely Japanese 
resistance to brain-based definitions of death should be 
traced more to indigenous religious beliefs called Shinto-
ism (6).” Some scholars have pointed out the significance 
of the body in perceiving death and interpersonal dimen-
sion of death (meaning that it is important for families to 
look at the body and understand the person is dead). Dis-
senters, who were against brain death determination in 
the early 1990s, in the Provisional Commission for Study on 
Brain Death and Organ Transplantation (Japan) relied on 
the uniquely Japanese religio-cultural background (8-10).
But some are skeptical about the significance of religios-
ity. Japanese society today has the custom of cremation, 
which appears contradictory to appreciation of the body. 
According to some surveys, the majority of Japanese was 
for brain death definition as early as the 1980s (11). The 
ratio of those who were for the neurological definition of 
death was not very different from those of other countries. 
Furthermore, resistance to brain death determination was 
not only religiously-motivated; doubt on the scientific va-
lidity of assessment procedures, and mistrust in the health 
care service (evoked by Wada case in 1968) contributed 
as well. Additionally, Shinto and the indigenized form of 
Buddhism give few clear instructions on health care. 
Therefore, it was difficult to develop a convincing argu-
ment based on religious writings.
Nevertheless, death is an exceptionally frequent subject 
in Shinto and Buddhism traditions, though these religions 
do not have a systematic way of actualizing their teach-
ings. Importantly, during the law-making process, parties 
(except the Communist Party) allowed their members to 
vote according to their individual standpoints (very rare). 
Their political views and positions were less significant in 
their voting decisions (12). In addition, religions in Japan are 
Shintoism, with 108 427 100 members (85.0% of the nation-
al population), Buddhism with 87 506 504 members (68.6%), 
and Christianity with 2 369 484 (1.86%) members, and others 
(the total population is 127.51 million (13). In the meantime, 
approximately 70% of Japanese in some surveys answered 
that they were “non-religious.” Their self-understanding as 
“non-religious,” despite their often plural affiliation, is ap-
parently based on a narrower definition of “religiousness” 
as conscious adherence to an established/revealed religion 
(differing from the Japanese indigenous religious tradition) 
(14). In Japan’s case, definitions of religions or religious-
ness should be broader and inclusive. Moreover, in Japan, 
where the Medical Practitioners Act stipulates the duty to 
rescue (Article 19), health care mostly lacks the practice of 
conscientious objection both by patients and health care 
professionals. Few Japanese health care professionals are 
religiously motivated in their vocation, primarily because 
the Japanese religious traditions have been scarcely inter-
ested in health care. The vast majority of Japanese health 
care professionals were in favor of the brain death determi-
nation (15). Therefore, the primary objection to brain death 
determination was not scientific. Obviously conscientious 
objection influenced the law-making process in the form of 
religio-cultural influence.
THE ImPLICATIONS OF JAPAN’S APPROACH
After the act was revised, the number of organ donations 
did not increase (the total number of donations after brain 
death and cardio-pulmonary death remained roughly the 
same), which made some think there was an urgent neces-
sity to alter the default death definition. Thus, a further revi-
sion is likely. Still the current Japan’s organ transplant act is 
a typical case of internationally exceptional legislation and 
it can serve as a unique and significant reference.
First, the double-standard death definitions did not cause 
serious social disruption, except for a shortage of trans-
plantable organs. With this scheme, in Japan, brain death 
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determination need not be uniformly implemented, if al-
lowed as an exception, even when a certain percentage of 
the population come to prefer brain death determination, 
in order to protect the values held by the minority. Although 
the enactment and the revision at first aimed at consensus 
on uniformity in death determination and failed, the result-
ing consensus for accommodation of the double standard 
death definitions is more beneficial than harmful.
The New Jersey and New York cases have endorsed dif-
ferent levels of conscience (religious and religious/moral 
reasons, respectively). Japan’s case has been influenced by 
religiosity or conscience but the organ transplant act of Ja-
pan grants no privileged/special status to conscience. Ja-
pan’s approach has integrated the religio-cultural dimen-
sion into the default procedure, thus exempting health 
care professionals from judging conscience individually 
and exempting the nation internationally. There remains 
a question on the justifiability of the privileged status of 
conscience. Conscience apparently has distinct qualities, 
namely consistency, sincerity, intensity, and so forth, which 
can elicit special consideration and mean greater account-
ability. However, it is at the political discretion of each na-
tion whether it grants conscience a privileged status. In 
the United States, they have constitutional foundations. As 
long as they are conscientious, the free exercise clause in 
the First Amendment to the US Constitution is applicable. 
Veatch argued that “The principle of equal respect would 
seem to require that if religious objections were permit-
ted, equally sincere, and equally deeply held, nonreligious 
philosophical objections would be equally acceptable.” He 
argued that exemption can be extended to comparable 
objections based on precedential court decisions on con-
scientious objection in military service and employment 
(16). Japan has a comparable constitutional stipulation – 
Article 20 (The Constitution of Japan) explicitly stipulates 
freedom of religion. This constitutional stipulation appar-
ently grants a privileged status to conscience. Special sta-
tus of conscience is defendable in policy-making in Japan.
Finally, accommodation of conscience, which in Japan 
arose spontaneously through a process of lengthy debate 
and deliberation, can have implications for other compa-
rable procedures in health care. In similar medical practic-
es possibly implemented in the future, the above idea of 
consensus for accommodation will be a promising option, 
allowing conscientious objectors to be exempt from the 
default procedures.
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